Abstract
Introduction
The authentication key exchange protocol enables communication parties to authenticate the parties and agree on the session key over an insecure public network. Bellovin and Merritt [1] introduced a two-party password-based authentication key exchange protocol. In their protocol, two communication parties must share a password beforehand. Since then, many two-party authentication key exchange protocols are proposed [2, 3, 8, 9] .
In large scale communication environments, it is not feasible for client-client communications to exchange session keys. Three party authentication key exchange (3PAKE) protocols can solve such problems. Some 3PAKE protocols are password-based [4, 5, 6, 7] . In a 3PAKE password-based protocol [10, 11, 13, 15, 16] , every client shares only a single password with a trusted server which provides authentication services for two clients. The trusted server helps two clients to complete mutual authentication and exchange session keys. In password-based 3PAKE protocols, although each client only needs to store one password, the server must store large numbers of passwords as the clients' number increases. The other kind of 3PAKE protocols is not password-based. With the help of the server, two clients apply symmetric key cryptosystems or public key cryptosystems to authenticate each other and exchange keys [17, 18] . Much research on 3PAKE protocols aims to improve the efficiency. Chen et al. [17] applied Schnorr's digital signature [19] to construct a 3PAKE protocol with fewer rounds. Unfortunately, their protocol suffers from stolen-verifier attacks [18] . Yang et al. [18] proposed an improved 3PAKE protocol (hereafter called YC-3PAKE protocol). YC-3PAKE protocol is more efficient. But YC-3PAKE protocol can not resist unknown key-share attacks [20] . An improvement version is also proposed in [20] . However, the proposed protocol requires password, smart card, and the public key cryptosystem. In fact, the password-based 3PAKE protocols always suffer from some potential attacks. For example, weak passwords always incur the offline guessing attack, the online guessing attack and the online undetectable guessing attack [10, 12, 13, 14] . Tan showed [22] that YC-3PAKE protocol is also insecure and suffers from impersonation-of-initiator attacks, impersonation-of-responder attacks and parallel attacks. Any adversary can impersonate one
Preliminaries
We recall some fundamental primitives such as bilinear pairings, some cryptographic assumptions and security model of 3PAKE protocol.
Bilinear pairings
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime order q , Q be a generator of G 1 . Let ê be an admissible map from G 1 ×G 1 to G 2 , which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For any
• 
Security Model
In this section, we review the formal model for 3PAKE protocols.
In a 3PAKE protocol, there are three participants: two clients and a server. The client A , B and the server S . Every party has their respective public/secret key pair By i C , we denote Client C's i -th instances. In this model, we assume that an adversary F can control all communications. The adversary will produce the following oracle queries. 
Definition 7
Let k be the security parameter of a 3PAKE protocol. By F we denote an adversary. The adversary F is given access to the above Execute, Send, Corrupt and Test oracle. F is required to make at most one Test query to an instance of an honest client. Let b and b be F 's output and the hidden bit b used by Test oracle, respectively.
We define the advantage of the adversary as the probability F wins the above game.
A 3PAKE protocol is said to secure if there is no PPT adversary with a non-negligible advantage.
Brief Review of YC-3PAKE protocol
Now, we briefly review YC-3PAKE protocol. The protocol is composed of two phases: the initialization phase and During the initialization phase, the server S selects system parameters: a finite field q F over a large prime q , an elliptic curve group by an order n, a point Q over the curve 
The authenticated key exchange phase can be depicted as Figure 1 . Tan demonstrated [22] that YC-3PAKE protocol is insecure and suffers from impersonation-ofinitiator attacks, impersonation-of-responder attacks and parallel attacks. Any adversary F can impersonate Client A to request the communication with Client B. F can also impersonate Client B to accomplish the session key exchange with Client A.
A new 3PAKE protocol
An Improvement on A Three-Party Authentication Key Exchange Protocol Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography Zuowen Tan
In this section, a new 3PAKE protocol is proposed. Here we do not use time-stamp techniques [22] . The new 3PAKE protocol is executed by three parties: party A, party B and server S. It consists of two phases: the initialization phase and the authentication key exchange phase.
The initialization phase is the same as that one in of YC-3PAKE protocol. But, all the participants' public keys are built in PKI. Client A and B need not register to the server S. For space limitations, we omit the detailed description of the initialization phase. The authenticated key exchange phase is divided into of three rounds.
Round 1:
Client A executes the following steps.
Step 1. Select a random integer
Step 3. Encrypt the transmitted message and compute its hash value ) , , , (
Step 4. Send (ID A ,Request) and (ID A , C AS ) to Client B and the server S, respectively. The message
Request denotes a request that Client A requires Client B to generate a session key cooperatively. 
Step 4. Send (ID B , Response) and (ID B , C BS ) to Client A and the server S, respectively. The message Response denotes a response that Client B accepts A's request.
Round 3:
After the server S obtains the message (ID A , C AS ) and (ID B , C BS ), S performs the following steps.
Step 1. Compute two symmetric keys ) , (
Step 2. Decrypt the two cipher texts C BS and C AS ) ( ) , , , (
Step 
Step 5. Send C SA and C SB to Client A and B, respectively.
After Client A receives C SA , A authenticates and computes the session key.
Step 1. Apply Ax
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Security proof and performance analyses
It is trivial to check the correctness of the proposed 3PAKE protocol. In this section, we give the security and performance analyses of the proposed 3PAKE protocol. , where Y is the value which is hashed into the session keys sk. F's view in the simulation is indistinguishable from its view in the actual run of the protocol. So, E can succeed in computing bR 1 or aR 2 only when the hash-query about Y is made. Moreover, E will have a non-negligible probability ) ( Adv Succ
Security analyses
The formal security model of 3PAKE protocols does not consider all the security properties. Here, we demonstrate that the proposed 3PAKE protocol holds the following security properties.
(1) Known-Key Security. In the new 3PAKE protocol, the session key sk depends on the secret random integers A r and B r , which are distributed uniformly in 
Performance analyses
In this subsection, we show the comparison of the proposed 3PAKE protocol with YC-3PAKE protocol in the term of performance in Table 2 . Table 2 demonstrates that the proposed 3PAKE protocol is more efficient.
YC-3PAKE protocol [18] is one of the most efficient 3PAKE protocols. Supposed that the size of q used in the ECC of the protocol is 160 bits and the symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm AES has the size 128 bits. And the size of identity is 80bit. Then, the total size of transmitted messages between the server and Client A(B) in YC protocol is 576 bits. In the proposed protocol, Client A(B) only needs to send one identity message and a ciphertext to the Serer S. The total size of transmitted messages between the server and Client A(B) in our new protocol is 336 bits. So compared with YC-3PAKE protocol, the total amount of the communication in our protocol is reduced by 480bits.
We denote one point multiplication by 1PM, one symmetric encryption/decryption operation by 1SE, and one bilinear map computation by 1BM. In YC-3PAKE protocol, Client A(B) needs 5PM and 2SE, while the Serer S requires 2PM and 4SE. In the proposed protocol, Client A(B) needs 4PM and 2SE. In fact, if the symmetric key A K ( B K ) is computed once by Client A(B), Client A(B) does not need to compute it during the later authentication key exchange. Therefore, the computation amount of Client A(B) is reduced by 2PM. Here, we omit the time of one hash operation for Client A(B). However, in our protocol, the Serer S requires 2PM + 4SE+4BL. Compared with the Serer S in YC-3PAKE An Improvement on A Three-Party Authentication Key Exchange Protocol Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography Zuowen Tan protocol, the Serer S needs more 4BL. In the mobile-commerce environments, the server has more computation resources. So it is reasonable to reduce the communication amount and the clients' computation amount. The server needs to store public keys Yes No
Conclusion
In this paper, we improved the YC-3PAKE protocol by applying bilinear maps. The technique can reduce the amount of message over the communication channel. The proposed three party authentication key exchange protocol requires the clients fewer computations. Therefore it is more feasible for mobilecommerce environments. We give a formal security proof of the new three party authentication key exchange protocol. The proposed three-party authentication key exchange protocol is provable secure under Computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions in the standard model.
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